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ABSTRACT 
 
Proposed by Kahneman and Tversky as an alternative model for analyzing choice under risk and uncertainty, 
prospect theory is characterized by a value function and a probability-weighting function which overweights 
small probabilities but underweights high and moderate probabilities. Since the probability-weighting function 
plays a crucial role in prospect theory and its applicability in various areas, the paper analyzes the 
correspondence between the probability-weighting function and the probability function embedded in choice 
under risk and uncertainty, and the properties of low-probabilities overweighting and subcertainty associated 
with the correspondence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two Israeli psychologists already famous in the field of judgment 
heuristics, as mentioned by Barberis (2013), published in the journal Econometrica in 1979 a paper entitled 
“Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk.”  With regard to their influential work, Barberis stated: 
More than 30 years later, prospect theory is still widely viewed as the best available description of how 
people evaluate risk under experimental settings. Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s papers have been 
cited tens of thousands of times and were decisive in awarding Kahneman the Nobel Prize in economic 
sciences in 2002. (Tversky would surely have shared the prize had he not passed away in 1996 at the 
age of 59) (p. 173).  
This inspiring paper “describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate 
the axioms of expected utility theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 263). Kahneman and Tversky argued 
that “utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate model and we propose an 
alternative account of choice under risk” (p. 263). As mentioned by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) with regard 
to the theory, they “presented a model of choice called prospect theory, which explained the major violations of 
expected utility theory in choices between risky prospects with a small number of outcomes (Kahncman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) (p. 297). They stated that this theory is characterized by a value 
function and a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale in that a value function is steeper for losses than 
for gains, and concave for gains, but convex for losses, while a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale 
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overweights small probabilities, but underweights high and moderate probabilities.  
As mentioned by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with regard to later research reports pertinent to prospect 
theory, “in an important later development, several authors (Ouiggin, 1982; Schmeidler, 1989; Yaari, 1987; 
Weymark, 1981) have advanced a new representation, called the rank-dependent or the cumulative functional, 
that transforms cumulative rather than individual probabilities” (p. 298). In response to the academic 
development and to extend the original version of prospect theory, which was established with the aid of 
evidence regarding choices between risky prospects containing merely a small number of outcomes, Kahneman 
and Tversky presented in their article “a new version of prospect theory that incorporates the cumulative 
functional and extends the theory to uncertain as well to risky prospects with any number of outcomes” (p. 298) 
and called the resulting model cumulative prospect theory. 
    While the influence of prospect theory is far-reaching, not only academically but also practically, its 
potential impact on later academic development can be described by the following statements presented by 
Barberis (2013): 
It is curious, then, that so many years after the publication of the 1979 paper, there are relatively few 
well-known and broadly accepted applications of prospect theory in economics. One might be tempted 
to conclude that, even if prospect theory is an excellent description of behavior in experimental settings, 
it is less relevant outside the laboratory. In my view, this lesson would be incorrect. Rather, the main 
reason that it has taken so long to apply prospect theory in economics is that, in a sense that I make 
precise in the next section, it is hard to know how to apply it. While prospect theory contains many 
remarkable insights, it is not ready-made for economic applications (pp. 173-174). 
Since the probability-weighting function plays a crucial role in prospect theory and its applicability in various 
areas, the present paper is to analyze the correspondence between the probability-weighting function and the 
probability function embedded in prospect theory, and the properties of low-probabilities overweighting and 
subcertainty associated with the correspondence.  
 . 
2. THE PROBABILITY-WEIGHTING FUNCTION 
 
As proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a prospect ),;...;,( 11 nn pxpx  can be described as a 
contract which yields outcome ix  with probability ip , where  1=∑
i
ip  for all outcomes, and decision 
making under risk concerns a choice between prospects. In prospect theory, an outcome is associated with two 
important elements, a value yielded by the outcome and a decision weight assigned by a decision maker. Inferred 
from choices between prospects, decision weights, they argued, measure not merely the likelihood of events 
perceived by a decision maker, but also the impact events may have on the desirability of prospects. A decision 
maker assigns decision weights to stated probabilities through a weighting function, whereas "the decision 
weights are not probabilities" in that "they do not obey the probability axioms and they should not be interpreted 
as measures of degree or belief" (Kahneman and Tversky ,1979, p. 280). The weighting function π  is 
presented by Kahneman and Tversky as an increasing function of p , with the salient properties 0)0( =π , and 
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1)1( =π . The outcomes of a strictly positive prospect are all positive, while those of a strictly negative prospect 
are all negative . If a prospect is neither strictly positive nor strictly negative, it is referred to as a regular 
prospect. In the terms of Kahneman and Tversky, the over-all value of a regular prospect can be represented as 
)()(),;...;,(
1
11 i
n
i
inn xppxpxV υπ∑
=
= , with 0)0( =υ  for the value function and 0)0( =π  and 1)1( =π for 
the weighting function π .  
While Kahneman and Tversky (1979) asserted that the decision weights assigned by a decision maker 
measure not merely the likelihood of events perceived by the decision maker, but also the impact events may 
have on the desirability of prospects, they proposed strict relations between the weighting function π  and the 
probability function p  by assuming that the weighting function π  is an increasing function of p  and is 
absolutely continuous with respect to p , which is indicated henceforth by p<<π . The impact events may have 
on the desirability of prospects appeared not to have been addressed in the specification of the weighting 
function so thoroughly as Kahneman and Tversky asserted, which necessitates further theoretical and empirical 
investigation in this respect. If the weighting function π  and the subjective probability function p  possessed 
by a decision maker have the properties of a finite measure, by Radon-Nikodym theorem, for the two σ -finite 
measures on ),( ℑΩ  such that p<<π  , there would exit a nonnegative density function f  such that 
∫= E fdpE)(π  for all ℑ∈E , and for two such densities f  and g , 0][ =≠ gfp . The assumption of 
p<<π  indicates that the weighting function π  is dominated by the probability function p , and the existence 
of such a unique nonnegative density function f suggests the tight link of the weighting function π  to the 
probability function.  
From the perspective of a correlating device }},{,{ PEiΩ  as described in Fudenburg and Tirole (1991), 
the structure of the information possessed by a decision maker is represented by the information partition }{ iE  
as a partition of the finite state space Ω , where iE consists of those states regarded by a decision maker as 
possible with the true state. In the case that a decision maker weights equally the probability of each iE∈ω , the 
unique nonnegative density function f  under the assumption of p<<π  may be further represented by a 
simple real function with finite range as
iE
i
i If ∑= α , where the constant iα  may be regarded as the weighting 
rate for the event iE  and iEI  is the indicator function of iE , assuming the value 1 on iE  and 0 on 
c
iE . In 
this framework, the weighting function π  can be represented as ∫ ∑=
i
iE E
i
ii dpIE απ )( , and 
)()( iii EpE απ = . The relation between the weighting function π  and the probability function p  is 
characterized by the weighting rates }{ iα corresponding to the information partition }{ iE  of the correlating 
device }},{,{ PEiΩ . To avoid the dominance of the probability function p  over the weighting function π  and 
to take into consideration the impact events may have on the desirability of prospects, the assumption of 
p<<π  may be relaxed by including a desirability-representing measure )( iEλ in the specification of the 
weighting function π  in such a form as ∫ ∑+=
i
iE E
i
iii dpIEE αλπ )()( . The properties and appropriate form of 
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a weighting function π  as such, with a desirability-representing measure included in it, needs to be thoroughly 
considered for the over-all value function to possess desirable properties for individual choice under risk and 
uncertainty. 
 
3. LOW-PROBABILITIES OVERWEIGHTING 
 
With regard to the properties of the weighting function, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that for 
very low probabilities p , they are generally overweighed by the weighting function so that pp >)(π . The 
proposition is derived from the evidence revealed by the responses of university faculty and students to some 
hypothetical choice problems presented to them. As presented by Kahneman and Tversky, for symmetric fair 
bets )5,.;5,.( yy −  and )5,.;5,.( xx −  with 0≥> yx , the averseness would generally increase with the size of the 
outcome, and thus symbolically )()()()( xxyy −+>−+ υυυυ , which yields )()( xx −−< υυ  by setting 0=y  
and )()( xx −′<′ υυ  by letting y  approach x . This indicates that the value function for losses is steeper than 
that for gains. With a larger proportion of respondents choosing (5,000, .001) instead of (5), by further assuming 
a concave graph for the value function for gains, Kahneman and Tversky showed that 
001.)000,5(/)5()001(. >> υυπ .  
The empirical evidence presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) regarding choices between risky 
prospects reveals the overweighting by a weighting function of low probabilities associated by a probability 
function with those events which are less likely to take place. Theoretically, for two totally finite measures μ  
and v  such that μν <<  and v  is not identically zero, “there exists a positive number ε  and a measurable 
set A  such that 0)( >Aμ  and such that A  is a positive set for the signed measure εμ−v .” (Halmos, 1950, 
p. 128). If the weighting function π  and the probability function p  possessed by a decision maker have the 
properties of a finite measure, for the two totally σ -finite measures such that p<<π  and π  is not 
identically zero, there would exist a positive number ε  and a measurable set E  such that 0)( >Ep  and such 
that 0)()( ≥∩−∩ EEpEE επ  for every measurable set E . The existence of such a positive number ε  and a 
measurable set E  indicates an infimum for the weighting of probabilities associated with events contained in 
the measurable set E , which can be expressed by επ ≥∩∩ )(/)( EEpEE . If the weighting function π  and 
the subjective probability function p  possessed by a decision-maker have the properties of a finite measure, the 
assertion presented by Kahneman and Tversky regarding the overweighting of low probabilities by a weighting 
function π  suggests that there would exist a positive number 1>ε  and a measurable set E  such that 
0)( >Ep  and )( kEp  is low for every EEk ⊂ and such that 1)(/)( >∩∩ EEpEEπ  for every measurable 
set E .  
As mentioned previously, in the framework with a correlating device }},{,{ PEiΩ and a decision maker 
weighting equally the probability of each )(ωω iE∈ , if the weighting function π  and the subjective 
probability function p  possessed by a decision maker have the properties of a finite measure, the weighting 
function π  can be represented as ∫ ∑=
i
iE E
i
ii dpIE απ )( , and )()( iii EpE απ = , where the constant iα  
may be viewed as the weighting rate which the weighting function associates with iE . An overweighting 
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pattern exists if 1>iα , while an underweighting pattern exists if 1<iα . As 1=iα , the weighting function 
may be viewed as unbiased. 
 
4. SUBCERTAINTY 
 
As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued, evidence indicates that the weighting function is characterized 
by the property of subcertainty, that is, for all 10 << p , 1)1()( <−+ pp ππ , whereas the weighting function 
possesses the property of low-probabilities overweighting. The observed phenomenon of subcertainty provides 
information with regard to a decision maker’s summation of the individual decision weights associated with all 
the distinct events comprising the whole state space and reveals another quite distinct characteristic possessed by 
the weighting function in contrast to Kahneman and Tversky’s assertion that 1)1( =π . As implied by the 
property of subcertainty and the property that 1)1( =π , it can be established that 
)())(())(( Ω≠+ πππ cii EpEp  or )())((
1
Ω≠∑
=
ππn
i
ii Ep , where for the disjoint sequence of 
Ω=∪ = inin EEE 11 ),,...,( . Thus, the evidence presented by Kahneman and Tversky indicated that the weighting 
function possessed by a decision maker may not possess the property of countable additivity and would not be a 
finite measure in this respect.  
In the study of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), they attempted to structurally refine the weighting function 
“in terms of the concept of capacity (Choquet, 1955), a nonadditive set function that generalizes the standard 
notion of probability. A capacity W  is a function that assigns to each SA⊂  a number )(AW  satisfying 
0)( =φW , 1)( =SW , and )()( BWAW ≥  whenever BA ⊃ ” (p. 300). However, even with further 
refinements of the model, the violation of the property of countable additivity by the weighting function and 
other critical elements characterizing the theory may make prospect theory “not ready-made for economic 
applications” (Barberis, 2013, p. 174) in that the theory may not be readily linked to concepts and analytical 
frameworks available in relevant areas and may need further elaboration for integrated applications. Questions 
may be raised: Is the phenomenon of subcertainty common or serious in a large sample? For those individuals 
who attempt to act rationally in choice under risk and uncertainty even though their actions may not be rational 
in all respects, would theories built on the assumption of rationality better describe their behaviors in choice 
under risk and uncertainty than other theories? 
While such properties of subcertainty and low-probabilities overweighting possessed by the weighting 
function as noted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) would provide an evidence-based perspective from which 
the probabilities-weighting behavior of an individual may be understood, the properties appear to be derived to a 
great extent from evidence on individuals’ choices among prospects containing two or a small number of 
outcomes and may not be valid or compatible in individuals’ choices among prospects containing a larger 
number of outcomes under specific contexts. For instance, suppose that the information partition 
),,...,,( 121 nn EEEE −  possessed by a decision maker is a finite, countable partition of the state space Ω , and 
for 1,...,1 −= ni , the value of )( iEp  is low and positive. With the information partition, those events with 
measure 0 are ignored in the decision maker’s formation of relevant choices. Under the proposition that low 
Chunyuan Chen  18
probabilities are overweighed, )())(( ii EpEp >π  for 1,...,1 −= ni , and thus ∑∑ −
=
−
−
>
1
1
1
1
)())((
n
i
i
n
i
i EpEpπ . 
For an information partition ),,...,,( 121 nn EEEE −  containing a large number of distinct events with iE , 
1,...,1 −= ni , associated with low probabilities and an event nE with a large probability )( nEp  and a 
corresponding decision weight ))(( nEpπ , the value of which is close to )( nEp , it would be very likely to be 
true that 1)()())(())((
1
1
1
1
=+>+ ∑∑ −
=
−
−
n
i
in
n
i
in EpEpEpEp ππ , as the number of the distinct events with low 
probabilities becomes large, which implies the violation of subcertainty. On the contrary, suppose that the 
property of subcertainty is true and 1)()())(())((
1
1
1
1
=+<+ ∑∑ −
=
−
−
n
i
in
n
i
in EpEpEpEp ππ . Thus, in the presence 
of an event nE with a large probability )( nEp  and a corresponding decision weight ))(( nEpπ  with a value 
close to )( nEp , it would be very likely to be true with the property of subcertainty that for some subset(s) iE , 
}1,...,1{ −∈ ni , )())(( ii EpEp <π , as the number of the low-probability events becomes large. This suggests 
the likelihood of the existence of incompatibility between subcertainty and low-probabilities overweighting in 
choice under risk and uncertainty. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Prospect theory has provided an inspiring perspective from which choice under risk and uncertainty may 
be understood. As an enormous number of studies have undertaken with great interest to address issues pertinent 
to this influential theory, there still exist unexplored issues or unanswered puzzles related to the evidence-based 
theory, which was proposed with an attempt to pave the way for better understanding and representing human 
psychological operations in choice under risk and uncertainty. This paper has addressed some critical issues 
regarding the correspondence between the weighting function and the probability function presented in prospect 
theory for the purpose of enhancing teaching and learning of this influential theory and drawing more research 
attention to the exploration of human decision-making under risk and uncertainty.    
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